The Supreme Court decision inUnited States v. McIntosh, decided on April 17, 2024, clarified an important procedural question about criminal forfeiture under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(b)(2)(B). The unanimous opinion addressed whether a district court’s failure to issue a preliminary forfeiture order before sentencing automatically prevents the judge from ordering forfeiture at sentencing. The Court held that such a lapse does not necessarily bar forfeiture, holding instead that the rule constitutes a timerelated directive subject to harmlesserror review not a mandatory claimprocessing or jurisdictional rule. This decision has significant implications for the enforcement of criminal forfeiture statutes, defendants’ procedural rights, and appellate review standards in federal criminal law.
Background of the Case
Facts and District Court Proceedings
Louis McIntosh was convicted by a jury for offenses including Hobbs Act robbery and related gun charges. At sentencing, the district court imposed a forfeiture judgment of $75,000 and a BMW tied to the crimes. The court instructed the prosecution to submit a proposed preliminary forfeiture order within a week. However, the government failed to do so before the court finalized sentencing.
Legal Challenge Based on Rule 32.2(b)(2)(B)
McIntosh challenged the forfeiture order, arguing that under Rule 32.2(b)(2)(B) which requires that a preliminary order be entered sufficiently before sentencing so the parties may suggest modifications the failure to do so invalidated any forfeiture at sentencing. He contended the rule imposed a mandatory procedural deadline that the court could not bypass.
The Supreme Court’s Decision
The Core Holding
The Court unanimously rejected McIntosh’s argument. Writing for all Justices, Justice Sotomayor explained that Rule 32.2(b)(2)(B) is a timerelated directive rather than a mandatory claimprocessing rule or a jurisdictional requirement. Thus, the district court retained the power to order forfeiture at sentencing despite missing the preliminary order deadline, provided that the error was harmless and did not prejudice the defendant.
Legal Reasoning and Precedent
The Court relied on its prior decisions distinguishing among jurisdictional deadlines, mandatory claimprocessing rules, and directives that simply guide timing. FollowingDolan v. United States, the Court found that Rule 32.2(b)(2)(B) lacks a specified consequence for noncompliance and allows flexibility (unless doing so is impractical), characteristic of timerelated directives.
Key Principles from the Decision
Nature of TimeRelated Directives
The Court emphasized that timerelated directives guide officials (here, the sentencing court) to act promptly but do not strip authority if deadlines are missed. Unlike claimprocessing rules whose violation may eliminate a party’s opportunity to raise an issue timerelated directives are subject to harmlesserror analysis.
HarmlessError Analysis
Since Rule 32.2(b)(2)(B) is not mandatory, appellate courts must assess whether missing the preliminary order caused prejudice. If the delay did not impair defendant’s rights such as ability to comment on the draft order the error may be excused under Rule 52(a).
Practical Implications
For Prosecutors and Court Administrators
The decision provides flexibility: courts may still conduct forfeiture at sentencing even when procedural steps are delayed, so long as the absence of a preliminary order does not harm the defendant’s right to participate. Government attorneys should still aim to comply timely but know deficiencies are not automatically fatal.
For Defendants
Defendants lose an automatic bar to forfeiture based on procedural delay alone. To succeed on appeal, they must demonstrate actual prejudice caused by the failure such as inability to contest forfeiture terms or significant asset depreciation during delays.
Comparisons with Other Circuits
Prior to the ruling, circuits were split: some treated Rule 32.2(b)(2)(B) as jurisdictional or mandatory. The Supreme Court resolved that split by uniformly classifying it as a timerelated directive, aligning circuits under harmlesserror review uniform standard.
Broader Legal Significance
Clarifying Court Rule Enforcement
The ruling reinforces the Supreme Court’s approach to procedural deadlines: not every missed deadline invalidates legal power, and courts retain discretion unless a rule is explicitly mandatory. This reinforces nuanced categories of procedural rules and prevents over-sanctioning for administrative errors.
Impact on Criminal Forfeiture Practice
Criminal forfeiture remains a powerful tool against illicit gains. This decision ensures courts can still address forfeiture even if preliminary steps are delayed, strengthening enforcement continuity while preserving defendant protections.
Summary of Key Takeaways
- The Supreme Court unanimously ruled that Rule 32.2(b)(2)(B)’s timing requirement is a time-related directive, not mandatory or jurisdictional.
- District courts retain authority to order criminal forfeiture at sentencing despite missing the preliminary order deadline.
- Appellate courts must apply harmlesserror review; forfeiture may be upheld if no prejudice occurred.
- Defendants must show actual procedural prejudice to challenge forfeiture appeals.
- Federal circuits previously split on the issue; this decision aligns them under a uniform standard.
United States v. McIntoshclarifies how federal criminal courts must treat missed deadlines under Rule 32.2(b)(2)(B). The decision rejects the notion that failure to issue a preliminary forfeiture order eliminates a court’s power to impose forfeiture at sentencing. Instead, such a rule is a timerelated directive, meaning courts may still act if the failure does not prejudice the defendant. This ruling reshapes forfeiture procedure doctrine, balancing enforcement flexibility with defendant safeguards, and resolves longstanding circuit conflicts over procedural rule categorization.